![]() ![]() She obtained her PhD in Economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 2005 and was a professor in the Vancouver School of Economics at the University of British Columbia between 20. Bombardini is a native of Italy where she obtained her undergraduate degree at the University of Bologna. Bombardini has studied the organization of interest groups and the behaviour of lobbyists in the US, and has linked the pattern of international trade to the inequality of education outcomes within countries, as well as the effect of international trade on pollution and infant mortality in China and the use of corporate philanthropy as a political tool. Her research focuses on political economy and international trade. Matilde Bombardini is Associate Professor in the Business and Public Policy group at the UC Berkeley Haas School of Business, a fellow of the National Bureau for Economic Research, a fellow of the Institutions, Organizations and Growth group at the Becker Friedman Institute and co-editor of the Journal of International Economics. We argue that these findings are best explained by investors influencing portfolio firm giving, suggesting that PAC giving may be another means by which influential shareholders impact corporate decision-making, in a manner that amplifies investors’ political voice.ĭr. Finally, we show that portfolio firms’ PAC expenditure experiences a relatively large shift at the acquisition date relative to past giving, whereas no such pattern is observed for institutional investors. The relationship is stronger for private funds, and those with high partisanship, suggesting the relationship is driven by investor preferences rather than strategic concerns. ![]() This increase in similarity of political giving coincides with the election cycle the acquisition takes place in, and is not driven by selection into specific politically strategic acquisitions, as convergence in political behavior is observed even for exogenously determined acquisitions caused by stock index inclusions. Using data on the political giving and ownership of all 13-F investors between 19, we show that the probability that a firm’s Political Action Committee (PAC) donates to a politician supported by an investor’s PAC nearly doubles after the investor acquires a large stake, and that it increases five-fold when the investor obtains a board seat. We show that corporate ownership may be an important mechanism by which institutional investors circumvent such constraints and amplify their influence. 主讲人: Matilde Bombardini ,加州大学伯克利分校哈斯商学院副教授Ĭampaign finance laws aim to limit an individual’s influence over the political process. legislators appear to have had accurate information on the China Shock, but did not place substantial weight on its adverse consequences.主题: Investing in Influence: Investors, Portfolio Firms, and Political Giving ![]() Facebook gives people the power to share and makes the world more open and connected. We cannot reject that politicians could predict the initial China Shock in the early 1990's, but not around 2000, when China started entering new sectors, and find a moderate role of constituent interests, compared to ideology. Join Facebook to connect with Matilde Bombardini and others you may know. We show how assuming perfect foresight of the shocks biases the role of constituent interests and how standard proxies to modeling politician's expectations bias the estimation. House of Representatives on China's Normal Trade Relations status, we formally test what information politicians had at the time of their decision and consistently estimate the weights that constituent interests, ideology, and other factors had in congressional votes. Employing repeated roll call votes in the U.S. This methodology offers a robust way to test hypotheses about the expectations of politicians at the time of their vote. We apply a moment inequality approach designed to deliver unbiased estimates under weak informational assumptions on the information sets of members of Congress. politicians have imperfect information about the extent of China Shock's repercussions in their district at the time when they voted on China's Normal Trade Relations status? Or did they have accurate expectations, yet placed a relatively low weight on the subconstituencies that ended up being adversely affected? Information sets, expectations, and preferences of politicians are fundamental, but unobserved determinants of their policy choices. Were its consequences unexpected? Did U.S. ![]() It is now both an internationally litigated issue and the casus belli for a global trade war. the rapid trade integration of China in the early 2000's, has had a profound economic impact across U.S. In the two decades straddling China's WTO accession, the China Shock, i.e. ![]()
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